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1 Introduction
Certification intermediaries are agents with the ability to reduce informa-
tional asymmetries between sellers and buyers. In this paper, we analyze to
which extent a monopoly certification intermediary actually reveals some new
information to uninformed (or less informed) parties. Without restrictions
on the set of contracts, transmission of information can take two forms: an
indirect revelation pattern through the self-selection of the informed parties
or a direct revelation pattern through the direct disclosure of information
by the intermediary. We show that if revealing information cannot increase
total surplus, there will never be direct revelation of information by the in-
termediary. However, at equilibrium there may be indirect transmission of
information. On the other hand, if the information transmitted increases
social surplus, there will always be some direct but suboptimal revelation of
information.
Examples of such intermediaries abound. When a firm decides to issue
securities to the public, it almost always hires an intermediary, typically an
investment banking firm. The bank audits and discloses information about
the economic situation and perspectives of the firm to all potential buyers
of the stocks. Marketing information services firms constitute another rel-
evant example. They sell studies to manufacturers and provide consumers
with quality assessments, market research, forecasting and consulting about
different products they offer.
In Lizzeri (1999) a privately informed seller owns a good but has no means
to signal the quality he offers. On the other hand, an intermediary owns a
technology that enables him to test the good and discover the true quality.
The intermediary moves first by choosing a unique price to charge to the
seller and a disclosure rule that specifies how information will be revealed
to the buyer. Then, the seller learns his quality and decides whether to pay
or not the price and go through the intermediary. If the seller pays, the
intermediary discovers the type and implements the disclosure rule. Finally
two buyers bid for the good, taking into account the information revealed, if
any, by the intermediary.
When trade is efficient in all states of nature, Lizzeri shows that there
always exists an equilibrium in which all types of seller ask for certification
and no information is revealed in equilibrium. Moreover, under certain rea-
sonable conditions on the distribution of types, this equilibrium is unique.
The intermediary captures all the extractable surplus, without revealing any
valuable information, and the seller chooses to be certified only to avoid being
taken as a low quality seller.
When trade is not always efficient the absence of any intermediary would
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involve either too little or too much trade in equilibrium. The intermediary
can increase social welfare by certifying only types for which trade is efficient.
The level of trade becomes efficient in equilibrium and the good is sold if and
only if it is valuable for the consumer. Still, the equilibrium does not (in
general) involve full disclosure, but only reveals whether trade is efficient or
not.
We depart from Lizzeri’s model in three respects: imperfect information
on the seller’s side about the quality of the good, the possibility for the
intermediary to indirectly transmit information through a menu of contracts
and finally the introduction of risk averse buyers.
We assume that ex ante nobody knows exactly the quality of the good.
However, the seller receives a private signal that is correlated with the true
quality. Introducing signals allows for a very general analysis that seems
economically reasonable and includes the case where the seller is perfectly
informed about the quality he offers.
In the first part of the paper, we assume that all agents are risk neutral.
We show that with more than two signals and a unique contract two types of
equilibria always exist: in one equilibrium the seller chooses to test the good
whatever his signal and no information is disclosed; in the second, all types
of seller but the lowest ask for certification and no information is disclosed.
In the latter equilibrium, there is always a minimum amount of information
transmitted at equilibrium, namely that the seller is not of the lowest type.
We show that a necessary and sufficient condition to have more revelation
of information at equilibrium is that the intermediary offer a menu of N
different contracts with no direct disclosure.
In the second part of the paper we introduce risk averse buyers. In this
case, revelation of information improves welfare since it enables better risk
sharing between the buyers and the intermediary who can extract a higher
rent. We show that there is always direct revelation of information in equi-
librium. More precisely, the intermediary offers a menu of contracts where
the information will be fully disclosed for all types above a certain threshold
and no disclosure is made for the others.
One illustration of such information transmission policy is given by JD
Power in the US.1 This company characterized as a “marketing information
firm” offers its expertise in certification to manufacturers. For the automo-
bile industry, JD Power releases ranking for vehicles performing above indus-
try average and simply lists below-average performers in alphabetical order.
Thus, the information is revealed for all qualities above a given threshold
and nothing is disclosed for lower quality cars.
1We thank Alessandro Lizzeri for pointing out this example to us.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sketch the main
structural features of the model. In Section 3, we develop the model with N
different signals, we state the necessary correspondence between the number
of signals and the number of alternatives of the seller, and we characterize
the equilibria of the game. In Section 4, we introduce risk averse buyers and
show that there is always some direct revelation of information at equilibrium.
Finally, some concluding remarks are given in Section 5.
2 The model
Consider an economy with one seller, an intermediary and n buyers. The
seller produces a good of quality τ , which is valued τ by the buyers but for
which neither the seller nor the intermediary have any value.
The seller does not know the quality of the good he offers but receives
a partially informative signal σ ∈ S.2 Since the true quality offered by
the seller is unknown, all the agents will have a prior on the value of τ
represented by the cumulative distribution F (·) on the closed support [τ , τ ],
where τ > τ ≥ 0. Once he has observed the signal, the seller updates his
beliefs about the quality of his good. Let Gi(·) be the assessment about this
quality if signal σi is received.
The signal can take N + 1 values, S = {σ0, ....., σN}, and the ex post
probability distributions
Gi(t) = Pr (τ < t/σ = σi)
satisfy
Gi(t) ≥ Gi+1(t) ∀t, ∀i < N,
that is, Gi+1 first order stochastically dominatesGi. In other words, receiving
a high signal is a good news in Milgrom (1981) sense.
Define ρi as the unconditional probability of receiving σi. Note thatX
i
ρiGi(t) = F (t) ∀t. (1)
We will call Ei [τ ], i = 0, ...N , the expected quality when signal σi is
received and EF [τ ] the ex ante expected quality.
2This assumption allows us to conduct a broader analysis that includes the case where
the signal is perfectly informative. Our results still hold if the seller is perfectly informed
about the quality of his good.
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The intermediary has a technology to test the quality of the good pro-
vided by the seller at a fixed cost normalized to 0. If the good is tested, the
intermediary discovers τ which becomes hard information.
Timing of the game
• At date 0, the intermediary commits to a menu of (at most) N +1 fees
P and disclosure rules D.
• At date 1, the seller receives the signal σ on the quality of the good.
• At date 2, the seller decides not to have his product tested (x = N) or,
he chooses contract j among the menu (x = Yj) for some j ∈ {0, ..., N}.
• At date 3, the intermediary observes the type if x = Y·. He discloses
the information he has committed to disclose. We call R(τ , D) the
information revealed given the type observed and the disclosure rule.
• At date 4, the buyers observe (P,D, x) and the information disclosed
by the intermediary, R (τ , D).
• At date 5, buyers bid independently and simultaneously for the good.
Strategies and equilibria
Because of their tractability and economic appeal, we will limit our anal-
ysis to pure-strategy sequential equilibria.
A strategy for the intermediary is a choice of (P,D) where P ∈ <N+1+
and D ∈ ΨN+1, the set of all possible disclosure rules. Since τ is hard
information once the good is certified, we can restrict our attention to disclo-
sure rules of the form “the information is perfectly revealed (R (τ ,D) = τ)
with probability α and nothing is revealed (R (τ , D) = ∅) with probability
1− α”.3 Without loss of generality, we can set Ψ = [0, 1] and the parameter
α, the probability of fully revealing the true quality, completely identifies the
disclosure rule.
A strategy for the seller is a function x(P,D, σ) : <N+1+ × [0, 1]N+1×S →
{Y1, ..., YN+1, N}. When a menu of contracts is offered, the seller has a richer
set of strategies that includes the choice of the particular contract.
Buyers will bid the expected value of the good conditional on the informa-
tion disclosed by the intermediary, the price of certification, the decision of
the seller to be tested or not, and the offer made by the intermediary. Hence, a
strategy for the buyer is a function β(·) : <N+1+ ×[0, 1]N+1×{Y1, ..., YN+1, N}×
∅ ∪ [τ , τ ]→ <+.
3This result would not hold anymore if there were some uncertainty about what the
intermediary knows (Shin (1994)).
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3 Direct versus indirect information trans-
mission
3.1 Equilibrium with a unique contract
We first consider the case where the intermediary is constrained to offer a
unique contract (P,α) to all types of seller. We show that there is never direct
disclosure of information. Indeed, only a minimum amount of information
can be indirectly transmitted in equilibrium.
The following proposition describes the equilibria of the game.
Proposition 1 In the case of a unique contract, there only exist two equilib-
ria: a fully pooling equilibrium and a semi-separating equilibrium where only
the seller with the lowest signal does not ask for certification. Both of them
involve no disclosure of information.
Proof. We start by stating three lemmas that we prove in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 There is no equilibrium in which no seller asks for certification.
Lemma 2 If a pooling equilibrium exists, it never involves full disclosure of
information.
Lemma 3 There is no equilibrium in which more than one type of seller do
not ask for certification.
Using lemmas 1 and 2, we rule out two pooling equilibrium candidates,
one in which no one asks for certification and the other where all types ask
for certification and the information is fully disclosed by the intermediary.
Lemma 3 shows that it is never optimal to leave more than the lowest type
without certification.
There are two remaining candidates: a fully pooling equilibrium with no
disclosure and a semi-separating equilibrium in which all types but the lowest
ask for certification and with no disclosure.
We show now that the intermediary is indifferent between those two can-
didates. Suppose there is a fully pooling continuation equilibrium and that
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are such that a deviator is assumed to have
received the lowest signal: σ0. The price that can be charged by the inter-
mediary is then
PFP = EF [τ ]−E0 [τ ] ,
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and the profit of the intermediary is
πFP = PFP = EF [τ ]−E0 [τ ] .
One can then easily check that all the incentive compatibility constraints
of the seller are weakly satisfied.
Let us now show that the previously described semi-separating equilib-
rium is payoff equivalent for the intermediary. The maximum price that can
be charged by the intermediary is:
PSS1 =
NX
i=1
ρi
1− ρ0
Ei [τ ]−E0 [τ ] ,
and the expected profit of the intermediary is
E(πSS1) = (1− ρ0)PSS1 =
NX
i=1
ρiEi [τ ]− (1− ρ0)E0 [τ ] .
Using (1),
NX
i=1
ρiEi [τ ] = EF [τ ]− ρ0E0 [τ ] .
Plugging this equality in the expression of E(πSS1), we obtain
E(πSS1) = EF [τ ]− E0 [τ ] = πFP .
This shows that the two continuation strategies constitute an equilibrium
of the subgame starting after the offer of the intermediary. Then we just
need to show that the intermediary has no incentives to deviate. But this is
trivially true, since the intermediary captures all the possible rent, EF [τ ]−
E0 [τ ]. No deviation can then give a higher payoff to the intermediary.
The intuition for this result is as follows. First of all, it is always optimal
to attract at least one type. Indeed, the intermediary has the ability to
modify any proposal that excludes all types in order to attract, at least, one
of them and get a positive profit. This eliminates any equilibrium where no
type chooses not to be certified.
Furthermore, it is never optimal to offer a pooling contract with full
disclosure. By offering a contract that reveals all the information for a given
type i, all types above i will choose this contract and get a positive rent. This
strategy is strictly dominated by one in which only the highest types ask for
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certification. Similarly, leaving more than one type without certification
would increase the outside opportunity of each type of seller and decrease
the rent captured by the intermediary. Thus, the intermediary never wants
to offer a contract in which more than the lowest type stays out of the
certification market.
Finally, a pooling equilibrium and a semi-separating equilibrium exclud-
ing the lowest type both with no disclosure are payoff equivalent for the
intermediary. On the one hand, the intermediary loses by letting the low-
est type out of the certification market since with positive probability the
seller will choose not to be certified. On the other hand, if the lowest type
is excluded, the expected quality of a seller asking for certification is higher
and, therefore, the buyers’ willingness to pay increases. The intermediary
can then extract this additional rent by increasing the certification price. It
turns out that this gain completely compensates the loss.
Notice that under both equilibria the intermediary is able to capture all
the rent (EF [τ ] − E0 [τ ]). Indeed, the seller can always guarantee himself
E0 [τ ], even without asking for certification. Then, in any equilibrium the
intermediary must leave him at least this payoff to satisfy the participation
constraint. However, although there is no disclosure and the intermediary
captures all the extractable surplus in the two equilibria, their information
content is different.
Let us define the minimum information transmission concept as follows.
Definition 1 The Minimum Information Transmission is the one that only
reveals that the seller is not of the lowest type.
The existence of the semi-separating equilibrium implies that a minimum
amount of information can always be transmitted. The information indirectly
revealed in such an equilibrium is that whenever the seller chooses to be
certified, the buyer is sure that he did not receive the lowest signal, whereas
when the seller does not ask for certification, the buyer knows that he is the
lowest type.
3.2 Design of the optimal contract with information
transmission
In the previous section we restricted the strategy set of the intermediary to
unique contracts. We now ask whether setting a unique price for certification
is the only optimal strategy of the intermediary. Indeed, we will show that
he can do as well, but no better, by offering a menu of prices and let the
seller self-select.
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Assume now that the intermediary can offer a menu of contracts {(Pi,αi)}Ni=1.
We are looking for a separating equilibrium in which all sellers except the
seller with the lowest possible signal4 ask for certification and where a seller
chooses contract (Pi,αi) after receiving signal σi.
Proposition 2 There exist a continuum of sequential equilibria in which
the intermediary offers a menu of contracts (Pi,αi)
N
i=1 such that each type of
seller self-selects and type 0 does not ask for certification. In all this equilibria
Pi = Ei [τ ]−E0 [τ ] and no information is disclosed for all i < N . Moreover,
any αN ∈ [0, 1] is equally optimal.
Proof. We first state the following lemma, proved in Appendix B:
Lemma 4 Suppose that at least two types choose different contracts. Then
in any optimal menu the intermediary offers N different contracts.
Using Lemma 4, we know that the intermediary will offer N different
contracts.
The following incentive compatibility conditions must be verified:
E0 [τ ] ≥ αiE0 [τ ] + (1− αi)Ei [τ ]− Pi ∀i > 0,
Ei [τ ]− Pi ≥ max {E0 [τ ] ,αjEi [τ ] + (1− αj)Ej [τ ]− Pj} ∀i, j.
Let us assume that only the downward adjacent incentive compatibility
constraints are binding. That is
Pi = Pi−1 + (1− αi−1) (Ei [τ ]− Ei−1 [τ ]) ,
P1 = E1 [τ ]−E0 [τ ] .
By induction,
Pi = (1− αi−1)Ei [τ ] +
i−1X
j=2
(αj − αj−1)Ej [τ ]− E0 [τ ] ,
and therefore the expected profit of the intermediary is
E (π) =
NX
ι=1
ρi
"
(1− αi−1)Ei [τ ] +
i−1X
j=2
(αj − αj−1)Ej [τ ]− E0 [τ ]
#
.
4The intermediary will never extract any rent by offering a contract to the lowest type
since the maximum price he can charge would be 0.
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This expression is independent of the value of αN , so any αN ∈ [0, 1] is
equally optimal. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that αN−1 = 0. This
implies that αN−2 is also equal to 0 and, by induction, that all αi, i < N ,
are equal to 0 at the optimum. Thus,
Pi = Ei [τ ]− E0 [τ ] ,
and the missing incentive compatibility constraints are verified.
The expected profit of the intermediary is
NX
i=1
ρi (Ei [τ ]− E0 [τ ]) = EF [τ ]− ρ0E0 [τ ]− (1− ρ0)E0 [τ ]
= EF [τ ]−E0 [τ ] ,
which is the maximum profit that he can extract in any equilibrium. There-
fore, offering such a menu of contracts is an optimal strategy.
The optimal menu involves the same disclosure rule αi = 0 for all types
i < N together with a price schedule Pi increasing in i. Thus, the interme-
diary is able to screen the different types of seller with a single instrument.
This is possible because if the buyers observe a seller choosing a higher certi-
fication price, they expect a higher quality and, thus, are ready to pay more
for the good. This is analogous to the burning money effect in standard
signalling models. The difference is that, in our model, this “burned money”
constitutes a transfer from the seller to the intermediary.
The intermediary extracts again the whole possible surplus. However, if
αi = 1 for some i, then incentive compatibility implies that the price charged
by the intermediary has to be the same for all types from i to N . Therefore,
all types above i choose the same contract and the intermediary leaves them
a rent. The intermediary can do better by hiding the information to the
buyers and no disclosure will happen at equilibrium for types below N .
Let us now introduce the following definitions:
Definition 2 An equilibrium has a Direct Revelation Pattern if the disclo-
sure rule satisfies αi 6= 0 for some i, that is, the intermediary reveals the true
quality with positive probability for some type.
Definition 3 An equilibrium has an Indirect Revelation Pattern if the dis-
closure rule satisfies αi = 0 for all i and different types of seller choose
different contracts, that is, the only information transmitted is through the
separation of types.
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By allowing the intermediary to offer a menu of contracts, we can now
state one of the main results of the paper:
Proposition 3 An optimal contract generates more than the minimum in-
formation transmission if and only if the intermediary offers a menu of N
different contracts.
Proof. a) We show first that if there is more than the minimum in-
formation transmission, then the intermediary offers a menu of N different
contracts. By lemma 2, there is never revelation of information in a pool-
ing equilibrium, therefore, the continuation must involve some separation of
types. By lemma 3, the intermediary offers a contract that attracts all types
except the lowest one. If only one contract is offered, it has to involve no
disclosure of information, and only the minimum information is revealed.
Thus, because more than the minimum is revealed, the intermediary offers
at least two contracts. Then, by lemma 4, the intermediary offers N different
contracts.
b) Now, according to definition 3, if the intermediary offers N different
contracts such that the different types of seller self-select, then, at least the
signal received by the seller is indirectly revealed. Moreover, by proposition
2 this is an equilibrium of the game. Hence, more than the minimum amount
of information is transmitted.
So far we have shown that there are three possible classes of equilibrium in
this certification game: a pooling equilibrium and a semi-separating equilib-
rium both with no disclosure and a unique certification price and also a menu
of N different contracts with no disclosure for all i < N . The information
content of all these equilibria is very different. In the pooling equilibrium,
no information is transmitted to the buyers, neither directly nor indirectly.
The semi-separating equilibrium with no disclosure reveals whether the seller
received the lowest signal or not. That is, just the minimum amount of in-
formation is transmitted. Finally, the equilibrium with a menu of contracts
involves a richer information transmission, since the choice of the seller per-
fectly reveals the signal he received and, furthermore, the true quality of the
highest type may be directly disclosed.
Moreover, the amount of information transmitted is an increasing func-
tion of the number of signals. As an illustration, consider the limit case
where the seller receives a perfectly informative signal. Applying Theorem 3
to a continuum of types, it is optimal for the intermediary to offer a contin-
uum of prices, P (τ ), such that each type of seller has incentives to choose
the contract designed for him. Extending Proposition 2, the optimal price
function proposed by the intermediary is P (τ) = τ − τ . The intermediary
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extracts the maximum possible rent, EF [τ ]− τ , but here the signal received
by the seller is perfectly revealed to the buyers through the self selection of
the seller.
However, the expected profit of the intermediary is exactly the same as
if a unique price was implemented. Therefore, our result is not robust to the
introduction of a small cost of writing contracts. Indeed, in the presence of
such a cost, the intermediary would always be strictly better off by offering
a single contract with no revelation of information.
Moreover, ex ante, information has no particular value since none of the
agents is ready to pay for it. Indeed, ex ante total surplus in this economy
is always equal to EF [τ ] and is not affected by the action of the intermedi-
ary. Therefore, there will never be direct revelation of information when the
intermediary cannot contribute to increase total surplus.
Corollary 1 When total surplus is independent of the intermediary’s action,
no direct revelation of information for i 6= N can arise at equilibrium.
Proof. Because the total surplus is fixed, the intermediary can only affect
the share he can extract. By revealing information for types below N , this
share decreases.
In the following section we show that the intermediary might do strictly
better with a menu of contracts rather than a unique price if buyers are
risk averse. Intuitively, the introduction of risk aversion on the buyers’ side
implies that the intermediary can increase social welfare and, in particular,
his own payoff, by inducing a better risk-sharing through the revelation of
information.
4 Equilibrium with risk averse buyers
Consider the model of Section 3 and assume now that the utility function of
a buyer is v (τ − β) if he buys a good of quality τ and pays a price equal to
β. We assume that v is increasing and strictly concave, and we normalize
v (0) = 0. If the intermediary commits to fully disclose the information,
the buyer will be willing to pay the true quality and will get an utility of
0 whatever the quality of the good. On the other hand, if he commits not
to reveal anything, the buyer will be willing to pay a price such that his
expected utility is 0.
Let βi be the price that a buyer is willing to pay for the good when he
knows the seller has received signal σi. Formally,
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βi : Ei [v (τ − βi)] = v (0) = 0,
and βi < Ei [τ ] by concavity of v.
Let βij (i > j) be the price that buyers are willing to pay when they
believe that the seller has received some signal between σj and σi. Formally,
βij :
iX
k=j
ρkPi
`=j ρ`
Ekv
¡
τ − βij
¢
= 0.
Since v is concave,
βij ≤
iX
k=j
ρkPi
`=j ρ`
βk ∀i, j, i > j. (2)
We first show that the pooling equilibrium with no disclosure is no longer
an equilibrium when buyers are risk averse. The intermediary can always do
better by revealing some information.
Proposition 4 For any j < N , any contract (P, 0) offered to all types from
j to N is strictly dominated by a menu of two contracts
³ eP , 0´ for all types
from j to N − 1 and (PN ,αN = 1) for type N .
Proof. Assume that there is an equilibrium in which the intermediary
offers contract
¡
P , 0
¢
and all types of seller from j to N ask for certification,
while all other types do not.
If the seller does not ask for certification, he reveals that his signal is
lower than j and, thus, buyers will be ready to pay β(j−1)0. If the seller asks
for certification, buyers will infer that he is of a type between j and N and
will be ready to pay βNj.
The equilibrium price, P , is then the maximum price the intermediary
can charge given the continuation strategies. It is defined as follows:
P = βNj − β(j−1)0.
The expected profit of the intermediary is:
E [π1] =
NX
i=j
ρi
¡
βNj − β(j−1)0
¢
. (3)
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Suppose now that the intermediary offers two contracts
n³ eP, 0´ , (PN ,αN = 1)o
defined as follows:
eP = β(N−1)j − β(j−1)0
PN = EN [τ ]− β(j−1)0.
It is straightforward to show that there is a continuation equilibrium in
which a seller of type N will choose the contract (PN ,αN = 1) , all types from
j to N −1 choose the contract
³ eP, 0´ and all remaining types do not ask for
certification. The expected profit of the intermediary is then:
E [π2] =
N−1X
i=j
ρi
¡
β(N−1)j − β(j−1)0
¢
+ ρN
£
EN [τ ]− β(j−1)0
¤
. (4)
Using equation (2) we get:
NX
i=j
ρiβNj ≤ ρNβN +
N−1X
i=j
ρiβ(N−1)j,
and
NX
i=j
ρi
£
βNj − β(j−1)0
¤ ≤ ρN £βN − β(j−1)0¤+ N−1X
i=j
ρi
£
β(N−1)j − β(j−1)0
¤
≤
N−1X
i=j
ρi
¡
β(N−1)j − β(j−1)0
¢
+ ρN
£
EN [τ ]− β(j−1)0
¤
.
So (4) is higher than (3) for all j and therefore offering
¡
P , 0
¢
was not an
equilibrium.
The result stems from the fact that the menu of contracts (even with
αN = 0) creates a better risk-sharing between the intermediary and the
buyers and, hence, the intermediary is able to extract a higher rent. On the
other hand, by directly revealing the information of type N , buyers bear even
less risk and, both the total rent and the share extracted by the intermediary
are larger. Finally, there is no cost for the intermediary in disclosing the
information of the highest type, because there are no types above N to
whom a rent should be given. In the following proposition we show that, in
general, more information will be directly disclosed at equilibrium.
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Proposition 5 When there is risk aversion on the buyers’ side, there is
always direct revelation of information. In equilibrium, there exists a type
k ∈ {0, ..., N} such that for all types i < k there is no disclosure and for all
types i ≥ k there is full disclosure.
Proof. Let us state the following lemma, proved in Appendix B:
Lemma 5 In any optimal contract at most the lowest type of seller does not
ask for certification.
Suppose the intermediary offers a menu of contracts (Pi,αi)
N
i=0. From
lemma 5 the intermediary will certify, at least, the N highest types. Incentive
compatibility requires that for all i and j
αiEi [τ ] + (1− αi) βi − Pi ≥ αjEi [τ ] + (1− αj)βj − Pj ,
and
αjEj [τ ] + (1− αj)βj − Pj ≥ αiEj [τ ] + (1− αi)βi − Pi,
which implies,
(αi − αj) (Ei [τ ]− Ej [τ ]) ≥ 0.
In particular, if αi = 0 then αj = 0 for all j < i and if αi = 1 then αj = 1
for all j > i.
Now, since the intermediary’s profit function is linear in αi, for all i, the
optimal disclosure rule for type i is either equal to 0 or 1.
Finally, the highest price, PN that can be set is
PN = PN−1 + αNEN [τ ] + (1− αN) βN − αN−1EN [τ ]− (1− αN−1) βN−1,
and the profit of the intermediary E [π] = ρNPN+
PN−1
i=1 ρiPi is an increasing
function of αN . The intermediary will therefore set αN = 1.
Furthermore, there exists a threshold k < N such that there is full dis-
closure for all types from k to N and no disclosure for the remaining ones.
So, the optimal menu
n
(Pi, 0)i<k ,
¡
P, 1
¢
i≥k
o
is characterized by
Pi = βi − β0
P = Ek [τ ]− β0.
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The expected profit of the intermediary for a given k is
E [π (k)] =
 Ek [τ ]
PN
i=k ρi +
Pk−1
i=1 ρiβi − (1− ρ0) β0 k > 1
(1− ρ0) (E1 [τ ]− β0) k = 1
E0 [τ ]− β0 k = 0,
and, the intermediary will choose k in order to maximize his expected profit.
We have shown that it is always optimal for the intermediary to fully
disclose the information of the highest type, because by doing so he increases
the total rent without any cost. However, it is not always optimal to fully
disclose all the information whatever the type of the seller. Indeed, even if the
total rent is increased when all the information is revealed to the buyers, the
intermediary is not able to extract all this extra rent because of the incentive
compatibility conditions.
The trade-off behind this result can be highlighted in the following way.
In the case of a pooling contract with full disclosure of information, the total
rent is maximized since it is equal to EF [τ ].5 But the intermediary has to
leave in expectation EF [τ ]− E0 [τ ] + β0 to the seller.
On the other hand, with the optimal menu that involves full revelation
from type k on, the total rent is EF [τ ] −
Pk−1
i=0 ρi (Ei [τ ]− βi) < EF [τ ] but
the intermediary has to leave a smaller rent
PN
i=k ρi (Ei [τ ]−Ek [τ ]) + β0 to
the seller.
Following this intuition, the assumption that the intermediary can per-
fectly discover the true quality is not essential. All our results would hold as
long as the information acquired by the intermediary is slightly better than
the precision of the signal. Indeed, in the limit case in which the intermedi-
ary can just observe the same signal as the seller, the equilibrium would be
to offer a menu of N contracts with no disclosure for i < N .
Finally, the intermediary’s contribution to total surplus is, in general, sub-
optimal. Indeed, it would be socially efficient to reveal all the information to
the buyers but, as we have shown, this strategy is not always in the interest
of the intermediary.
In Appendix A, we construct an example with three different signals in
which, for different values of the parameters, the equilibrium involves either
a unique contract for all types with full disclosure or a menu of contracts
leaving the lowest type out of the certification market.
5With a unique contract with no disclosure, the total surplus is βF < EF [τ ].
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5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we developed a simple model of information transmission through
certification intermediaries. A seller with no means to signal his quality has
the possibility to be certified by an institution that owns a technology to dis-
cover the true quality and can credibly commit to a disclosure rule. The focus
of the paper is the extent to which a monopoly intermediary has incentives
to disclose some information to the buyers.
We distinguish two types of revelation of information. The buyers can
learn some new information directly through the announcement made by the
intermediary or indirectly through the separation of types induced by the
mechanism offered to the seller. That is, even without any announcement,
the intermediary can actually transmit some information if he offers a menu
of incentive compatible contracts to the seller.
We have shown that Lizzeri’s result relies on a limitation of the space
of contracts and the inability of the intermediary to increase total surplus,
since information has no ex ante value for the buyers. When information
becomes valuable, the intermediary acts as a traditional monopolist. At
equilibrium, he always discloses some information but less than what would
be socially optimal. Introducing competing intermediaries should then favor
more revelation.
17
A Numerical example
We consider the following example with three signals, σ0, σ1 and σ2.
• v (τ − β) = 1− e−γ(τ−β)
• τ ∈ [1, 4]
• F (τ ) = τ−13
• G0 (τ ) =
½
τ−1
1.5 if τ ≤ 2.5
1 otherwise
• G1 (τ ) =
 0 if τ ≤ 2τ−21.5 if τ ≤ 3.5
1 otherwise
• G2 (τ ) =
½
0 if τ ≤ 3
τ − 3 otherwise
We can easily determine βi such that Ei [v (τ − βi)] = 0 for i = 0, 1, 2.
Depending on the values of the parameters, there are three possible equi-
libria.
1. A unique contract with full revelation of information chosen by all
types. The price offered to the seller is then:
bP = 7
4
− 1
γ
ln
µ
1.5γ
e−γ − e−2.5γ
¶
,
and the expected profit of the intermediary is:
π
³ bP´ = bP.
2. A contract with full revelation of information that excludes the lowest
type. The price offered to the seller is then:
eP = 11
4
− 1
γ
ln
µ
1.5γ
e−γ − e−2.5γ
¶
,
and the expected profit of the intermediary is:
π
³ eP´ = (1− ρ0) eP.
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3. A menu of contracts with full revelation of information for the highest
type and no revelation for type 1. The prices offered to the seller are
then:
P1 =
1
γ
ln
µ
e−γ − e−2.5γ
e−2γ − e−3.5γ
¶
,
and
P2 =
7
2
− 1
γ
ln
µ
1.5γ
e−γ − e−2.5γ
¶
,
and the expected profit of the intermediary is:
π (P1, P2) = ρ1P1 + ρ2P2.
Consider the case where ρ0 =
8
9 , ρ1 = ρ2 =
1
18 shown in Figure 1.
)Pˆ ( )Pˆπ
( )1 2,P Pπ
( )Pπ  γ
Figure 1: Profit of the intermediary as a function of the degree of risk aversion
in the case where ρ0 =
8
9 , ρ1 = ρ2 =
1
18 .
When γ is close to 0, buyers are nearly risk neutral and therefore, the
equilibrium is to offer a menu of contracts that excludes the lowest type and
do not disclose information for type 1.
However, as buyers become more risk-averse, the positive effect of in-
creasing total surplus through revelation of information regarding all types
is larger than the negative effect of leaving some rents to types 1 and 2. This
stems from the fact that ρ0 is sufficiently large and therefore the probability
of actually having to leave a rent is low.
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( )Pπ 
( )1 2,P Pπ( )Pπ 
( )Pˆπ
γ
Figure 2: Profit of the intermediary as a function of the degree of risk aversion
in the case where ρ0 = 0.1, ρ1 = 0.6, ρ2 = 0.3.
Consider finally the case where ρ0 = 0.1, ρ1 = 0.6, ρ2 = 0.3, in Figure 2.
When ρ0 is small enough, offering a unique contract as above can never
be an equilibrium. Again, when γ is low, the “leaving the rent” effect domi-
nates and the intermediary prefers not to reveal the information for type 1.
However, this willingness to pay for information increases with γ while the
“leaving the rent effect” is constant. Therefore, from a certain threshold of γ,
the intermediary prefers to offer a unique contract that excludes the lowest
type and fully reveals the information. ρ0 is low, so leaving type 0 out of the
certification market is not very costly.
B Proof of lemmas
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. At the first stage, the intermediary offers a price P and a disclosure
rule α ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose there is a continuation pooling equilibrium in which no seller
goes through the intermediary. Because buyers do not learn anything new,
they will be willing to pay the expected value, EF [τ ] for the good. If the
buyers observe a seller going through the intermediary and no information is
revealed, they will think that he is a σi seller with probability νi.
So, a seller of type i does not go through the intermediary if
EF [τ ] ≥ (1− α)
X
j
νjEj [τ ] + αEi (t)− P. (5)
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The payoff of the intermediary when offering (P,D) is equal to 0. Now,
this is an equilibrium if there are no alternative price and disclosure rule
that could increase the payoff of the intermediary. Consider the following
deviation:
P 0 = EN [τ ]− EF [τ ]− ε
α0 = 1,
with ε small.
Then, a seller of type N will go to the intermediary since
EF [τ ] < (1− α0)
X
j
ν0jEj [τ ] + α
0EN [τ ]− P 0
< EF [τ ] + ε.
Indeed, either no type asks for certification and the price paid by the
buyer will be EF [τ ] or only the highest types ask for certification and the
outside option is smaller than EF [τ ] .
But then, the profit of the intermediary is at least equal to
P 0ρN > 0,
and therefore, this is a profitable deviation for the intermediary. This is true
whatever the out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Suppose it exists a pooling equilibrium with full disclosure, α = 1
and a price P .
Since the true type of the seller will be fully revealed, then the buyers
will pay a price equal to τ . So, ex ante, an i signal seller’s expected payoff
when playing the equilibrium strategy is
Ei [τ ]− P i = 0, ...N.
If a seller plays an out-of-equilibrium strategy (not go to the intermedi-
ary), the buyers will be ready to pay Ei [τ ] if they expect the seller to have
received signal i. Suppose that the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the buyers
are that the seller has received signal with probability νi ∈ [0, 1], then the
seller’s expected payoff is X
j
νjEj [τ ] ∀i.
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So, type i seller plays the equilibrium strategy if
Ei [τ ]− P ≥
X
j
νjEj [τ ] i = 0, ..., N.
For the continuation strategies to be a pooling equilibrium, the price paid
to the intermediary must satisfy for any i:
P ≤ Ei [τ ]−
X
j
νjEj [τ ] ≤ 0. (6)
Since all types of seller have their product tested, the expected profit of
the intermediary is P ≤ 0.
Now, consider the following deviation: P 0 6= P , P 0 = ε ≥ 0, α0 = 1.
Suppose that the ex-post beliefs of the buyers if the seller does not go through
the intermediary, ν0i, are such that ∃i < N : ν0i 6= 0 then, if ε ≤ EN [τ ] −P
j ν
0
jEj [τ ] the high signal seller prefers to be certified:
EN [τ ]− ε >
X
j
ν0jEj [τ ] .
So, the equilibrium ex-post beliefs are given by ν0N > 0. But then ε can
be made strictly positive, and the intermediary’s payoff with this deviation
is at least
ερN > 0,
and therefore, the intermediary is strictly better-off than with the previous
strategy.
On the other hand, suppose ν 0i = 0 for any i < N and ν0 6= 1. From
(6), P < 0. Therefore, setting ε = 0 is a profitable deviation. Finally, if
ν 0i = 0 for any i < N and ν0 = 1, P = P
0 = 0, a contradiction (the out of
equilibrium beliefs cannot be different if all strategies are the same).
Thus, there is no P such that (P,α = 1) could induce a pooling continu-
ation equilibrium.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose that
x = Y1 for all σi with i ≥ j > 1
x = N for all σi with i < j.
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The highest price that can be charged by the intermediary is then:
PSSJ =
NX
i=j
ρi
NP
k=j
ρk
Ei [τ ]−
j−1X
i=0
ρi
j−1P
k=0
ρk
Ei [τ ] .
The expected profit of the intermediary is
E
¡
uISSJ
¢
= PSSJ
NX
k=j
ρk
= EF [τ ]− 1j−1P
k=0
ρk
j−1X
i=0
ρiEi [τ ]
< EF [τ ]− E0 [τ ] = uIFP .
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Consider 2 different types: m, k with m < k. Suppose m and k
choose the same contract: (Pm,αm). On the other hand, all remaining types,
i 6= m, k self-select by choosing contract (Pi,αi).6 This implies
Em [τ ]− Pm ≥ αiEm [τ ] + (1− αi)Ei [τ ] ,
αmEk [τ ] + (1− αm)Em [τ ]− Pm ≥ αiEk [τ ] + (1− αi)Ei [τ ] ,
Ei [τ ]− Pi ≥ αmEi [τ ] + (1− αm)Em [τ ] ∀i 6= m, k,
and the expected profit of the intermediary isX
i6=m,k
ρiPi + (ρm + ρk)Pm. (7)
Consider the introduction of a new contract, (Pk,αk) with αk = αm such
that
Em [τ ]− Pm ≥ αkEm [τ ] + (1− αk)Ek [τ ]
and
Ek [τ ]− Pk ≥ αmEk [τ ] + (1− αm)Em [τ ] .
6It is straightforward to show the same result by assuming that some of the remaining
types may choose the same contract.
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We have that
Pk = Pm + (1− αm) (Ek [τ ]− Em [τ ]) > Pm.
No type i /∈ {m,k} has incentives to choose (Pk,αk).
On the other hand, the expected profit of the intermediary is nowX
i6=m,k
ρiPi + ρmPm + ρkPk. (8)
So, noting that (8) is larger than (7), the intermediary always has incen-
tives to offer a menu of contracts in which two different types choose two
different contracts.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. Suppose the intermediary offers an incentive compatible menu of con-
tracts (Pi,αi)
N
i=j such that all types below j prefer not to ask for certification.
The expected profit of the intermediary is
P
i≥j ρiPi.
Consider now the introduction of a new contract for type j − 1 with
αj−1 = 0 and Pj−1 > 0 that satisfies
αjEj−1 + (1− αj)βj − βj−1 ≤ Pj − Pj−1 ≤ αjEj + (1− αj) βj − βj−1.
All contracts are still incentive compatible and the intermediary’s ex-
pected profit is
P
i≥j ρiPi + ρj−1Pj−1 >
P
i≥j ρiPi.
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